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SaiDhiraj Amuru, Harpreet S. Dhillon, R. Michael Buehrer
Abstract
In this paper, we study jamming attacks against wireless networks. Specifically, we consider a
network of base stations (BS) or access points (AP) and investigate the impact of a fixed number of
jammers that are randomly deployed according to a Binomial point process. We shed light on the network
performance in terms of a) the outage probability and b) the error probability of a victim receiver in
the downlink of this wireless network. We derive analytical expressions for both these metrics and
discuss in detail how the jammer network must adapt to the various wireless network parameters in
order to effectively attack the victim receivers. For instance, we will show that with only 1 jammer
per BS/AP a) the outage probability of the wireless network can be increased from 1% (as seen in
the non-jamming case) to 80% and b) when retransmissions are used, the jammers cause the effective
network activity factor (and hence the interference among the BSs) to be doubled. Furthermore, we
show that the behavior of the jammer network as a function of the BS/AP density is not obvious. In
particular, an interesting concave-type behavior is seen which indicates that the number of jammers
required to attack the wireless network must scale with the BS density only until a certain value beyond
which it decreases. In the context of error probability of the victim receiver, we study whether or not
some recent results related to jamming in the point-to-point link scenario can be extended to the case of
jamming against wireless networks. Numerical results are presented to validate the theoretical inferences
presented.
Index Terms
Networks, jamming, outage, error probability, Binomial point process, stochastic geometry.
I. INTRODUCTION
The inherent openness of the wireless medium makes it susceptible to both intentional and
un-intentional interference. Interference from the neighboring cells is one of the major causes of
un-intentional interference. On the flip side, intentional interference, such as jamming attacks,
corresponds to adversarial attacks on a victim receiver. In this paper, we study jamming attacks
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2against wireless networks. Jamming-related studies not only provide insights into offensive attack
strategies, but also enable us to understand the vulnerabilities of existing systems. Most studies
that are related to jamming attacks in the physical layer only consider the presence of a single
node (source-destination pair) and develop optimal jamming strategies, see [1]-[6] and references
therein. Having gained insights about the jamming behavior in a single communication link
scenario, the next step is to understand the jamming behavior against networks.
Jamming against wireless multi-hop networks has previously been addressed from an op-
timization perspective in [7]-[10]. More specifically, [7]-[9] consider the problem of jammer
placement against wireless multi-hop networks with the aim of stopping the flows in the network.
The jammer-to-flow assignment problem i.e., optimally assigning jammers to stop flows in the
network based on their locations and other constraints such as power, was considered in [10].
All these works model networks as a graph and study the jamming problem with an aim to find
the best set of nodes/edges to attack so that the network is disconnected. While these studies
indicate which nodes/links to be attacked, they do not address the problem of jamming attacks
against wireless networks from a physical layer perspective and don’t consider infrastructure
networks such as cellular or WiFi. Therefore, in this paper, we address the problem of attacking
a wireless network when the jammers are randomly deployed in a given area and how this attack
can be realized at the physical layer. Since the victim receiver location is typically unknown a
priori, the jammers are randomly deployed in a given area.
Specifically, in this paper we consider a wireless network comprising of BS or APs that are
deployed in an area of interest and investigate the impact of a fixed number of jamming nodes
that are randomly deployed in the same area. The network performance under the jamming
attack is analyzed from the perspective of the downlink of a victim receiver that is accessing
this wireless network. Since the number of jammer nodes is fixed, we model the jammer network
using a Binomial point process (BPP) [11]. Notice that such an analysis is practical and useful
as it will help in understanding the number of jamming nodes that would be needed to disrupt
a wireless network, for example to attack an enemy network in a military setting.
Using the proposed jammer network model, we analyze the jamming performance against the
wireless network in terms of a) the outage probability and b) the error probability of a victim
receiver in this wireless network. We derive analytical expressions for both these metrics and
analyze in detail the jamming impact against the wireless network in the presence of shadowing
3and fading typically seen in wireless environments. As will be shown, accounting for log-normal
shadowing in both the outage and error probability analysis is complicated. Therefore, in this
paper, we use the Gaussian-Hermite quadrature approximation [12] to account for this log-normal
shadowing and give simple analytical expressions for both these metrics. We also show how this
approximation affects the theoretical outage and error probabilities by comparing them with
numerical simulations.
Using the closed form outage-probability expressions, we discuss in detail how the jammer
network parameters must change according to the wireless network so as to maximize outages at
the victim receiver. While the outage probability characterizes the overall network performance
in terms of the interference experienced at the victim receiver, it typically ignores the signaling
schemes used by the BS/APs to communicate with the victim receiver. For instance, irrespective
of the modulation schemes employed by the various nodes in the network, the outage probability
analysis uses the power levels of the various signals in order to evaluate the signal-to-interference
and noise ratio at the victim receiver. Hence, the outage probability analysis alone does not cover
all the aspects of jamming a wireless network. Therefore, in this paper we also study the jamming
performance in terms of the symbol error probability of the victim receiver which explicitly takes
into consideration the signaling schemes used by the BS/AP and also the jammers.
The error probability of the victim receiver can be analyzed by using tools from stochastic
geometry when random spatial distributions are considered [14]. However, there is relatively
limited work in the literature (related to non-jamming scenarios) that performs such an analysis
(see [15]-[17] and references therein). In [15], [16], a novel approach termed as equivalent-in-
distribution is developed to estimate the error probability of the victim receiver in the presence
of interference generated from a Poisson field which is modeled as an alpha-stable distribution.
However, no such equivalent distributions or approximations are known for the cases in which
the interference arises from a Binomial field [11], which is the model considered for the jammers
in this paper. In [17], a nearest neighbor approximation (corresponding to the modulation scheme
of the victim) is used to analyze the error probability in a non-jamming scenario. In this method,
the error probability depends on the minimum distance of the modulation scheme and the number
of nearest neighbors for the points in the modulation scheme. Since no equivalent distributions
or approximations are known for the interference originating from a Binomial field, in this paper
we follow the approach in [17] to analyze the error probability of the victim receiver.
4The various parameters that impact the victim receiver performance include the shadowing
variance, transmit power of the BSs, the BS density, the network loading, i.e., the density of
simultaneously active BSs, the jammer signal power, and the number of jammers. The effect
of each of these parameters on the jamming impact at the victim receiver is examined both
analytically and numerically. For instance, we show that in order to maintain a constant outage
probability at the victim receiver, the number of jammers a) increases with the victim signal power
levels, b) decreases with increasing network load, and c) decreases with increased shadowing
levels. The jamming impact against the wireless network is also addressed when retransmissions
are employed. Furthermore, we will show that the jammer network obeys an interesting concave-
type behavior as a function of the BS/AP density in order to maintain a constant outage
probability at the victim receiver. Similar analysis of the jammer network impact is performed in
the context of the error probability of the victim receiver. In addition to the above analysis, we
discuss the impact of some recent findings related to jamming in a point-to-point link scenario
1
, when analyzing jamming against wireless networks. While extending the analysis in [2] to the
case of networks is beyond the scope of this paper, we discuss in detail the behavior of various
jamming signals using extensive simulations.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a victim wireless network of BSs or APs that are modeled according to a
homogeneous Poisson point process (PPP) Ψ of density λT on R2 [18], [19]. The downlink
analysis in this paper is performed at the victim receiver which is assumed to be at the origin.
The behavior of this wireless network is studied when it is attacked by a jammer network with
NJ jammers. We model the jammer network according to a BPP denoted by ΨJ . Fig. 1 shows
the wireless network, the victim receiver and the jammers that attack this wireless network.
The received signal at the victim receiver is given by
y =
√
PTχ0(1 + r0)
−α
2 h0s0 +
∑
i∈Ψ\{0}
ai
√
PTχi(1 + ri)
−α
2 hisi
︸ ︷︷ ︸
iagg(r0)
+
∑
i∈ΨJ
√
PJχJi (1 + di)
−α
2 giji︸ ︷︷ ︸
jagg
+n,
(1)
1In [2], we showed that the optimal jamming signaling scheme against a digital amplitude-phase modulation scheme is not
Gaussian signaling and that it depends on the victim signal parameters
5where the BSs at distances ri from the origin send symbols si ∈M that are taken from a digital
amplitude phase modulated constellation M such as BPSK or QPSK with E(|si|2) = 1. The
random variable χi = exp(xi) has a log-normal distribution and models the shadowing such that
xi ∼ N (µχ, σ2χ), where µχ and σχ are respectively the mean and standard deviation of xi. In (1),
hi indicates a complex Gaussian random variable that models Rayleigh fading with E(|hi|2) = 1.
The variables r0, s0, χ0 and h0 are the respective parameters for the serving BS/AP with which
the victim receiver communicates. All other BSs signals are therefore interfering with the serving
BS signal to the victim receiver. In other words, we assume universal frequency reuse. Without
loss of generality, it is assumed that all the BSs transmit signals at power levels PT (a common
assumption made in the literature [19]). In (1), ai is an indicator variable that indicates whether
or not the ith BS is active at a given time instant. We assume that the interfering BSs (the ones
other than the serving BS) independently transmit signals with probability p, also known as the
activity factor or the network loading factor [20]. In other words, p indicates the average fraction
of the BSs that are active at any time instant once the serving BS association is completed [20].
Therefore, ai = 1 with probability p and is 0 otherwise.
In (1), α indicates the standard power-law path loss exponent such that α > 2. It has been
shown in [21]-[23] that the commonly used distance-based path loss model r−αi is inaccurate for
smaller values of ri and that it is used only for analytical tractability. Therefore, in this paper,
we use a more realistic model given by (1+ri)−α to model the path loss between the ith BS and
the victim receiver. This model also avoids discontinuity at the origin [21]-[23]. In Section V,
we show that this model results in an interesting concave-type behavior for the jammer network
distribution as a function of the BS/AP density and the shadowing levels. In what follows, it is
assumed that hi and χi are respectively independent and identically distributed.
The jammers are located on a compact disk of radius RJ centered at the origin denoted by
b(0, RJ) ⊂ R2. Let NJc = NJpiR2
J
λT
indicate the number of jammers per cell (or per BS). In
Section V, we will discuss how NJc affects the jamming performance at the victim receiver.
The jammers attack the wireless network by sending signals ji ∈MJ , where MJ indicates the
signaling scheme employed by the jammers. The random variable gi is a zero-mean complex
Gaussian random variable that models Rayleigh fading such that E(|gi|2) = 1. The random
variable χJi models the log-normal shadowing such that χJi = exp(xJi ) where xJi ∼ N (µχ, σ2χ).
The jammers send signals at a constant power level PJ in order to attack the wireless network.
6Fig. 1. [System Model] The cross marks indicate the BS/APs in the wireless network that are distributed according to a PPP.
The Voronoi tessellation indicates the coverage regions of the BS/APs. The square indicates the victim receiver which is at the
origin. The black arrow indicates the link between the the closest BS and the victim receiver. The triangles indicate the jammers
that are distributed according to a BPP within the black-dotted region of radius RJ .
In (1), n indicates the zero-mean complex additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) as seen at
the victim receiver. Define the reference signal-to-noise-ratio as SNR = PT
σ2
. This is termed the
transmit SNR. Along similar lines, we define the reference jammer-to-noise ratio as JNR = PJ
σ2
.
We assume that the shadowing is constant over the time of interest and hence the serving BS
is selected based on the average received signal strength. In other words, shadowing impacts the
BS selection but fading does not. Under such conditions, the displacement theorem [24], [25]
states that the overall effect of shadowing can be taken into consideration as a perturbation in
the locations of the BSs (recall that the BSs are distributed according to a PPP) if E(χ2/αi ) <∞.
When this condition holds true, without loss of generality, a new equivalent PPP with density
λTE(χ
2/α
i ) can be defined to model the BS locations [25]. Now, the strongest BS association
policy in the original PPP maps to being equivalent to the nearest BS policy association in
the transformed PPP without shadowing. Therefore, r0, s0 and h0 in (1) will now represent the
parameters of the signal received from the closest BS in the transformed PPP. In what follows,
for the ease of notation, we denote λTE(χ2/αi ) as λT . Note that the condition E(χ
2/α
i ) < ∞ is
satisfied in most practical settings that usually consider log-normal shadowing with finite mean
and standard deviation [24], [25].
Since the BSs are modeled according to a PPP, r0 is a random variable with probability density
function (pdf) equal to fr0(η) = 2πλTη exp(−πλTη2) [17]. The interference caused by the BSs
besides the serving BS i.e., Ψ\{0}, is collectively denoted by iagg(r0). The interference caused
by jammers is collectively denoted by jagg. The jammers can transmit either additive white
7TABLE I
NOTATIONS USED
Notation Definition
Ψ, λT PPP network of BSs/APs; density of BSs/APs
ΨJ , NJ BPP network of jammers; number of jammers
NJc Number of jammers per cell (per BS)
PT , PJ Transmit power of BSs, jammers
r0, h0, s0 Distance, channel and symbols of the closest BS/AP
ri, hi, si Distance, channel and symbols of the ith BS/AP
ai, p Indicator variable; activity factor for interfering BSs
di, gi, χ
J
i , ji Distance, channel, shadowing and symbols of the ith jammer
µχ, σχ shadowing parameters
α Power-law path loss exponent
Gaussian noise (AWGN) or any standard modulation scheme in order to attack the receiver [2].
The performance when the jammers use different types of jamming signals will be discussed in
detail in Section V. A list of notations used is shown in Table I.
III. OUTAGE PROBABILITY OF THE VICTIM RECEIVER
We first analyze the network performance from an outage probability perspective. When the
interference is treated as noise, the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) is the most
appropriate metric that captures the link quality from the serving BS to the victim receiver.
However, since we are interested in interference-limited scenarios, we consider the signal-to-
interference ratio (SIR) as the metric for the outage probability analysis (all the analysis presented
below can be extended in a straightforward manner to consider SINR). For the system model
defined in (1), the SIR is given by
SIR =
PT |h0|2(1 + r0)−α∑
i∈Ψ\{0} aiPT |hi|2(1 + ri)−α +
∑
i∈ΨJ PJχ
J
i |gi|2(1 + di)−α
. (2)
In order to effectively attack the wireless network, the jammer network intends to maximize
the outage probability denoted by Po(SIR < θ) at the victim receiver. Here θ indicates a SIR
threshold necessary for successful communication. We next derive the outage probability of the
victim receiver whose SIR is given by (2).
Theorem 1: The outage probability of a victim receiver, assumed to be at the origin, in the
presence of BSs distributed according to a PPP and jammers distributed as a BPP in b(0, RJ)
8is given by
Po(SIR < θ) =1−
∫ ∞
r0=0
exp
[
−2πpλT
∫ ∞
r=r0
[
1− 1
1 + θ(1 + r0)α(1 + r)−α
]
rdr
]
×


2
R2J
∫ RJ
r=0
∫ ∞
χ=0
1
1 + θ(1+r0)
αPJχ
PT
(1 + r)−α
r exp
[
−
[
log(χ)√
2σχ
]2]
χ
√
2σχ
dχdr


NJ
×
2πλT r0 exp(−λTπr20)dr0 (3)
Proof: See Appendix A.
The outage probability in (3) can be simplified by noticing that∫ ∞
r=r0
[
1− 1
1 + θ(1 + r0)α(1 + r)−α
]
rdr =
∫ ∞
q=1+r0
q − 1
1 + q
α
θ(1+r0)α
dq, (4)
and by using the following integral∫
x− 1
1 + x
α
a
dx = 2F1
[
1,
2
α
; 1 +
2
α
;
−xα
a
]
x2
2
− 2F1
[
1,
1
α
; 1 +
1
α
;
−xα
a
]
x
a
, (5)
where pFq(a1, . . . , ap; b1, . . . , bq; x) is the generalized Hypergeometric function given by [26]
pFq(a1, . . . , ap; b1, . . . , bq; x) =
∞∑
n=0
(a1)n(a2)n . . . (ap)n
(b1)n(b2)n . . . (bq)n
xn
n!
, (6)
where (ai)n is the Pochhammer symbol given by Γ(ai+n)/Γ(ai) and Γ(.) is the Gamma function.
Along similar lines, we can simplify∫ RJ
r=0
1
1 + θ(1+r0)
αPJχ
PT
(1 + r)−α
rdr (7)
by using the following integral∫
(x− 1)xα
a+ xα
=
x2
2
− 2F1
[
1,
2
α
; 1 +
2
α
;
−xα
a
]
x2
2
− x+ 2F1
[
1,
1
α
; 1 +
1
α
;
−xα
a
]
x. (8)
Finally, by using (4)-(8), the integrals in outage probability in (3) can be simplified.
Note that the outage probability Po(SIR < θ) is dependent on θ,NJ , PT , PJ , λT , p and σχ. The
effect of each of these parameters on the outages caused by the jammer network at the victim
receiver will be studied in detail in Section V.
Corollary 1: The minimum number of jammers N∗J , distributed according to a BPP, necessary
to disrupt the victim network i.e., to achieve a required outage probability denoted by Po,th at
9the victim receiver is given by
N∗J = argmin
NJ
|Po(θ,NJ , PT , PJ , λT , p, σχ)− Po,th| , (9)
where Po(θ,NJ , PT , PJ , λT , p, σχ) is given by (3).
Gaussian-Hermite Quadrature Approximation: Notice that evaluating (3) with respect to
the log-normal distribution of χ is complicated. Furthermore, this procedure is computationally
intensive when we intend to evaluate (9) in order to find the optimal number of jammers to attack
a network. Hence, we propose to use the Gaussian-Hermite quadrature (GHQ) approximation
for evaluating
∫ RJ
r=0
∫ ∞
χ=0
1
1 + θ(1+r0)
αPJχ
PT
(1 + r)−α
r exp
[
−
[
log(χ)√
2σχ
]2]
χ
√
2σχ
dχdr (10)
which is the second term in (3). Specifically, the GHQ approximation states that∫ ∞
−∞
exp(−x2)f(x)dx ≈
N∑
n=1
wnf(xn), (11)
where wn and xn are the weights and roots of the Hermite polynomial [12]. This approximation
is known to be exact if f(x) is a polynomial of degree 2N −1. For other general functions, this
approximation sum is known to converge to the integral when N →∞ [13].
For the case of a log-normal distribution, using the GHQ approximation for a function f(χ),
we have by an appropriate change of variables
∫ ∞
0
f(χ)
exp
[
−
[
log(χ)√
2σχ
]2]
χ
√
2σχ
dχ =
1√
π
∫ ∞
−∞
f(
√
2σχy) exp(−y2)dy ≈ 1√
π
N∑
n=1
wnf(
√
2σχxn). (12)
Therefore, by using (8) and (12), the double integral in the evaluation of the BPP interference at
the victim receiver shown in (3) is now changed to a summation over N terms each defined by
Hypergeometric functions. Of course, the accuracy of the approximation depends on the number
of terms N used in (12). In Section V, we show that N = 15 terms are sufficient to obtain close
approximations for the outage probability.
IV. ERROR PROBABILITY
As mentioned earlier, the outage probability analysis considers the power levels of the various
signals involved to estimate SIR and outage probability. But this analysis alone cannot capture
the overall jamming impact at the victim receiver. For instance, in our recent works [2], [3],
10
we showed that considering the victim and the jammer signaling schemes explicitly in the error
probability analysis and not treating them as AWGN gives interesting insights into the jamming
behavior. Therefore, in this section we evaluate the error probability of the victim receiver and
investigate whether or not the results in [2], [3] related to jamming against a point-to-point link
hold true for the case of wireless networks. In the analysis that follows, we assume that the
victim receiver has perfect channel state information of the serving BS i.e., the BS which is
closest to it at a distance r0.
From a stochastic geometry perspective, the error probability analysis in a non-jamming
scenario was studied recently in [15]-[17] by explicitly considering the signal levels and not
the power levels of the various signals involved. The error probability analysis in this paper is
not a straightforward extension of the analysis in [15]-[17] because the system model considered
in this paper differs in the following aspects: a) a BPP model for the jammers that attack the
victim receiver is considered, b) the effects of shadowing are introduced, and c) a realistic path
loss model given by (1 + ri)−α is considered which is different from the path loss models
used in [15]-[17]. In addition to obtaining analytical expressions for the error probability of the
victim receiver, we discuss in detail the impact on the error probability of the victim receiver as
a function of the various jamming signaling schemes (i.e., the various digital amplitude-phase
modulation schemes) that may be used by the jammers.
The maximum likelihood-based demodulator for decoding the symbol s0 at the victim receiver
when the received signal is given by (1) is
sˆ0 = arg min
s˜0∈M
{
Λ(s˜0) = |y −
√
PTh0(1 + r0)
−α
2 s˜0|2
}
. (13)
By ignoring the constant energy terms, this expression can be further simplified as
Λ(s˜0) ∝ PT |∆s0,s˜0|2|h0|2(1 + r0)−α + 2(1 + r0)−
α
2
√
PTR
(
v(r0)h
∗
0∆
∗
s0,s˜0
)
, (14)
where ∆s0,s˜0 = s0 − s˜0, v(r0) = iagg(r0) + jagg + n indicates the total aggregate interference,
R(x) indicates the real part of the variable x, and x∗ indicates the complex conjugate of x.
It is clear that in order to analyze the error probability of the victim receiver, v(r0) has
to be characterized. This entails characterizing the statistics of iagg(r0) and jagg. In [14], the
interference generated by a Poisson network model i.e., iagg(r0) was shown to be equivalent
in distribution to an alpha-stable distribution. This equivalence was exploited in [15] and [16]
to explicitly characterize the SINR in a non-jamming scenario (in terms of the signal levels as
11
opposed to power levels that are commonly used to analyze outage probability, see [15], [16] for
more details) to evaluate the error probability at a receiver. By using the signal-based formulation
as opposed to power level-based formulation, the explicit dependency of the error probability on
the modulation schemes employed by the receiver were addressed in [15] and [16]. However, as
noted in [11] and references therein, there are no closed form approximations for the interference
originating from a Binomial field which is the model used for the jammer network distribution
in this paper. Hence, alternate techniques are necessary to analyze the error probability of the
victim receiver considered in this paper. Specifically, we use the nearest neighbor approximation
(corresponding to the modulation scheme M) method [17] that provides exact expressions for
binary modulations and approximations for higher order modulations.
The following steps are used to obtain the overall average symbol error probability (ASEP):
1) The pairwise error probability (PEP) conditioned on r0, h0 and the specific realization of
the jammer network ΨJ is first expressed as a function of the aggregate interference v(r0).
2) Then using the Gil-Pelaez transform [28], we obtain the cumulative distribution function
for the aggregate interference v(r0) which is used to obtain the average pairwise error
probability (APEP) by averaging over r0, h0 and the jammer network statistics i.e., the
BPP model.
3) Finally, APEP is then used to compute the ASEP using the nearest neighbor (NN) approxi-
mation corresponding to M [17].
A. PEP derivation
Let P(s0 → sˆ0|h0, r0,ΨJ) indicate the probability with which an error is made in detecting
the actual symbol s0 as sˆ0. Note that this happens when the likelihood metric is maximized or
in other words (13) is minimized at a symbol sˆ0 which is different from s0. Mathematically, this
can be represented as follows;
P(s0 → sˆ0|h0, r0,ΨJ) = P(Λ(s˜0 = sˆ0) < Λ(s˜0 = s0)) = P(Λ(s˜0 = sˆ0) < 0)
= P
{
R
(
v(r0)h
∗
0∆
∗
s0,sˆ0
)
< −(1 + r0)
−α
2
√
PT |∆s0,sˆ0|2|h0|2
2
}
(a)
= P
{
R (v(r0)) < −(1 + r0)
−α
2
√
PT |∆s0,sˆ0||h0|
2
}
= FvRe
[
−(1 + r0)
−α
2
√
PT |∆s0,sˆ0||h0|
2
]
,
(15)
12
where FvRe indicates the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of vRe = R(v(r0)). In the above
equation, (a) follows from the fact that conditioned on r0, |h0| and the realization ΨJ , the
aggregate interference v(r0) is a circularly symmetric random variable. This is because the
constellation symbols are equally probable and symmetric, gi and hi are circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian random variables and χJi is a real random variable. Hence, v(r0) has the same
distribution as v(r0) exp(−j(θ0 + ∠∆∗s0,sˆ0)) (∠x indicates the phase of x).
Let Φx indicate the characteristic function of a random variable x. By using the Gil-Pelaez
transform [17] to express the cdf FvRe(x) as a function of the characteristic function of the
aggregate interference and the facts that (i) v is a circularly symmetric random variable which
implies that Φv(|ω|; r0) = R(Φv(|ω|; r0)), Φv(|ω|; r0) = ΦvRe(|ω|; r0) [16], and (ii) ΦvRe is a real
function, we have
FvRe(v) =
1
2
+
1
π
∫ ∞
0
sin(|ω|v)ΦvRe(|ω|; r0)
|ω| d|ω|,
PEP(∆s0,sˆ0; |h0|, r0,ΨJ) =
1
2
− 1
π
∫ ∞
0
sin
[
|ω|(1+r0)−
α
2
√
PT |∆s0,sˆ0 ||h0|
2
]
Φv(|ω|; r0)
|ω| d|ω|. (16)
Please see [17, Appendix II] for more details on the derivation of (16).
The next step is to evaluate Φv(|ω|; r0). Since iagg(r0), jagg and n are independent of each
other we have
Φv(|ω|; r0) = Φiagg(|ω|; r0)Φjagg(|ω|)Φn(|ω|). (17)
Therefore the APEP is given by
APEP = E|h0|,r0,ΨJ [PEP(∆s0,sˆ0; |h0|, r0,ΨJ)]
=
1
2
− 1
π
∫ ∞
0
Er0
{
E|h0|
{sin [ |ω|(1+r0)−α2 √PT |∆s0,sˆ0 ||h0|2
]
|ω|
}
Φiagg(|ω|; r0)
}
×
EΨJ
[
Φjagg(|ω|)
]
Φn(|ω|)d|ω|
(i)
=
1
2
− 1
π
∫ ∞
0
Er0
{ √
πPT
4(1 + r0)
α
2
|∆s0,sˆ0| exp
[
−PT |∆s0,sˆ0|
2|ω|2
16(1 + r0)α
]
Φiagg(|ω|; r0)
}
×
EΨJ
[
Φjagg(|ω|)
]
Φn(|ω|)d|ω|, (18)
where (i) follows by using the fact that h0 is a zero-mean complex Gaussian random variable
with unit variance i.e., |h0| is a Rayleigh random variable. Thus, we have to first evaluate the
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characteristic functions of iagg(r0) and jagg. It is known that Φn(|ω|) = exp(−|ω|2/4) for a zero-
mean, unit variance complex Gaussian random variable [30]. It remains to evaluate Φiagg(|ω|; r0)
and EΨJ
[
Φjagg(|ω|)
]
.
The characteristic function Φjagg(|ω|) for a given realization of the jammer topology is first
evaluated and then averaged over the BPP in order to obtain EΨj
[
Φjagg(|ω|)
]
.
Φjagg(|ω|) (i)= Φjagg(ω) = E
[
exp
[
jω
NJ∑
i=1
√
PJχJi giji(1 + di)
−α
2
]]
=
NJ∏
i=1
E
[
exp
[
jω
√
PJχJi giji(1 + di)
−α
2
]]
(ii)
=
NJ∏
i=1
Φz
[
ω
√
PJχJi (1 + di)
−α
2
]
(iii)
=
NJ∏
i=1
ΦzRe
[
ω
√
PJχJi (1 + di)
−α
2
]
(iv)
=
NJ∏
i=1
Ezˆ
[
cos
[
|ω|
√
PJ(1 + di)
−α
2 zˆ
]]
, (19)
where (i) follows by taking into account the fact that
√
χJi giji is a circularly symmetric random
variable [17, Appendix I], the expectation is with respect to the statistics of χJi , gi and ji because
di is fixed for a given realization of the jammer network, (ii) follows by defining a new variable
z =
√
χJi giji, (iii) and (iv) hold because z is a circularly symmetric random variable [17,
Appendix I] and by a change of variable zˆ = zRe , R(z). Since χJi is an independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variable, in what follows we denote it by χ for the ease of
notation.
Theorem 2: The characteristic function of the jammer interference as seen at the victim
receiver i.e., EΨJ
[
Φjagg(|ω|)
]
is given by
EΨJ
[
Φjagg (|ω|)
]
=
(
1
|MJ |
∑
ji∈MJ
Eχ
{
1
R2J
[
1F1
[−2
α
; 1− 2
α
;− (|ω|
√
PJχ|ji|)2(1 +RJ)−α
4
]
(1 + RJ)
2 − 1F1
[−2
α
; 1− 2
α
;− (|ω|
√
PJχ|ji|)2
4
]]
− 2
R2J
[
1F1
[−1
α
; 1− 1
α
;− (|ω|
√
PJχ|ji|)2(1 +RJ )−α
4
]
(1 +RJ)− 1F1
[−1
α
; 1− 1
α
;− (|ω|
√
PJχ|ji|)2
4
]]})NJ
.
(20)
Proof : See Appendix B.
In Appendix B we show that the error probability of the victim receiver depends on the
jammer’s signaling scheme via the term E(zˆ2q) (which was encountered in (32) in the derivation
14
of the EΨJ
[
Φjagg(|ω|)
]) given by
E(zˆ2q) =
Γ(q + 1
2
)√
π
E(χq)E
[|ji|2q] . (21)
Here q is a non-negative integer and Γ(x) is the gamma function.
Remark 1: Notice that any constant modulus signaling scheme will have the same value for
E(zˆ2q). This indicates that irrespective of the constant modulus-signaling scheme used by the
jammer, the error probability at the victim receiver will remain the same for the system model
given in (1). This behavior is due to the fact that the jammer is not aware of the channel gi
between itself and the victim receiver and hence cannot compensate for the random rotations
introduced by gi. Therefore, the results in [2] and [3] which indicate that modulation-based
jamming is optimal, cannot be reproduced in this case. This behavior will be explained in detail
via numerical results in Section V.
Corollary 2: The APEP of the victim receiver when the jammer network uses a zero-mean,
unit variance AWGN jamming signal is given by replacing E(|ji|2q) in (21) with 2
qΓ(q+ 1
2
)√
pi
.
Proof : From [31, Eq. 16], it is known that if X is a Gaussian random variable with mean ν and
variance σ2, we have
E
[
(X − ν)2q] = σ2q 2qΓ(q + 12)√
π
. (22)
The proof is straightforward using this result.
Remark 2: Corollary 2 states that the theoretical expression for AWGN jamming can be
obtained by replacing E(|ji|2q) in (21) with (22) i.e., instead of averaging over the various
modulation symbols that the jammer may use, the averaging is performed over the Gaussian
distribution. While it is not easy to explain the AWGN jamming signal performance by (20)
alone, based on the results from our earlier works in [2], [3] it is expected that when the jammer
is not aware of the channel gi, then the jamming performance of any modulation-based jamming
signal and AWGN jamming signal will be the same. However, when the jammer can compensate
for the effects of the fading channel, then the error probability at the victim receiver can be
significantly increased by using specific modulation schemes. We will discuss this behavior via
numerical results in Section V.
Corollary 3: The characteristic function of the aggregate interference from the BSs other than
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the serving BS is given by
Φiagg(ω; r0) = exp
[
πpλT r
2
0 − T1 + T2
]
, (23)
where T1 is given by
T1 =
1
|M|
∑
si∈M
πpλT (1 + r0)
2
1F1
[−2
α
; 1− 2
α
;−(|ω|
√
PT |si|)2(1 + r0)−α
4
]
.
and T2 is given by
T2 =
1
|M|
∑
si∈M
2πpλT (1 + r0)1F1
[−1
α
; 1− 1
α
;−(|ω|
√
PT |si|)2(1 + r0)−α
4
]
.
Proof : See Appendix C. Notice that the effect of the modulation scheme used by the BSs is
captured explicitly in Φiagg(ω; r0).
Remark 3: Since the path loss model used in this paper is different from the ones used in
[15]-[17], the characteristic function Φiagg(|ω|; r0) of the interference from the BSs other than
the serving BS is also different from the ones obtained in [15]-[17].
Finally, by using Φiagg(|ω|; r0) and EΨJ
[
Φjagg(|ω|)
]
, the overall APEP in (18) can be evaluated
irrespective of the signaling schemes used by the BSs and the jammers.
B. Gaussian-Hermite quadrature approximation
In order to evaluate the jammer characteristic function EΨJ
[
Φjagg(|ω|)
]
, it is necessary to
evaluate functions of the form Eχ [pFq [a1, . . . , ap; b1, . . . , bq; f ]]. Since it is computationally
intensive to evaluate the integrals of hypergeometric functions, we again use the Gaussian-
Hermite quadrature approximation.
Lemma 1: By using the Gaussian-Hermite quadrature approximation, we have
Eχ [pFq [a1, . . . , ap; b1, . . . , bq; f ]] ≈ 1√
π
N∑
n=1
wnpFq
[
a1, . . . , ap; b1, . . . , bq; f exp(
√
2σχxn)
]
, (24)
where wn and xn are the weights and roots of the Hermite polynomial [12].
Proof : The proof follows by using the series expansion of the generalized Hypergeometric
function pFq [a1, . . . , ap; b1, . . . , bq; f ] in (6) and the GHQ approximation in (12).
In Section V, we show that N = 10 terms can closely approximate (24).
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C. ASEP Evaluation
ASEP can be upper bounded by using the union bound and APEP as follows:
ASEP ≤ 1
M
M∑
m=1
Nm∑
i=1
APEP(|∆m,i|), (25)
where M is the total number of equi-probable symbols in the constellation M, Nm are the total
number of neighbors for the mth symbol and |∆m,i| is the distance between the mth symbol
and its ith neighbor. Notice that this expression can be evaluated fairly easily for lower order
modulations such as BPSK and QPSK. However, this expression quickly becomes unwieldy
for higher order modulations such as 16-QAM. By using the nearest neighbor approximation
(corresponding to M), ASEP can be approximated as
ASEP ≈ 1
M
M∑
m=1
Nm∆minAPEP(|∆mmin|), (26)
where ∆mmin is the minimum distance between the mth symbol and all its neighbors and Nm∆min is
the number of such neighbors that are at a distance of ∆mmin. For symmetric constellations, where
∆mmin is the same for all symbols, then we have ASEP ≈ Navg∆minAPEP(|∆min|) where Navg∆min =
1
M
∑M
m=1N
m
∆min
. For instance, in the case of 16-QAM, we have Navg∆min = 3 and ∆min = 2/
√
10
(assuming unit-average energy for the modulation scheme). It is important to observe that this
method gives exact error probability expression only for binary modulation schemes. We will next
present several results that compare these theoretical expressions with Monte-Carlo simulations.
V. RESULTS
In this section, numerical results are shown in order to validate the theoretical inferences
presented earlier and also to shed light on the jamming impact against the wireless network
in terms of the outage and error probability of the victim receiver. Unless otherwise specified,
we use a BS deployment density equivalent to that of an hexagonal grid with 500m inter site
distance i.e. λT = 2/(
√
3 · 5002m2) [29]. The simulation area is chosen such that an average of
100 active BSs (according to the activity factor p) are present in the wireless network (to avoid
edge effects). The path loss exponent α is taken to be 3.7, µχ = 0 and σχ = 6dB. In order
to account for the shadowing in the BS network, using the displacement theorem the effective
BS density is taken to be λT exp
[
2σ2χ
α2
]
. The radius RJ of the compact disk b(0, RJ) in which
the jammers are distributed according to a BPP depends on λT , NJ and NJc as
√
NJ
piλTNJc
. The
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Fig. 2. [Effect of NJ ]: Outage probability of the victim
receiver as a function of the number of jammers NJ in the
network. p = 0.01, PT /PJ = 0dB. The solid lines indicate
the outage probability obtained via Monte Carlo simulations
and the markers indicate the theoretical outage probability
evaluated using (3).
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Fig. 3. [Effect of NJc ]: Outage probability of the victim
receiver as a function of the number of jammers per cell
(or per BS) NJc in the network. p = 0.01, NJ = 4,
PT /PJ = 0dB. The solid lines indicate the outage probability
obtained via Monte Carlo simulations and the markers indicate
the theoretical outage probability evaluated using (3).
outage and the error probabilities are functions of PT , PJ , λT , NJ , NJc, RJ , σχ, and p and are
studied next.
A. Outage Probability
Since we consider SIR to study the outage probability, only PT
PJ
matters and not their actual
values. Unless otherwise mentioned, we take this to be 0dB. It is easy to realize that the outage
probability increases (decreases) as PT
PJ
decreases (increases). Hence, due to a lack of space, we
do not discuss the impact of the jammer network as a function of PT
PJ
.
Fig. 2 shows the outage probability of the victim receiver as a function of the number of
jammers in the network. Firstly see that the theoretical expression evaluated using (3) perfectly
matches with the Monte Carlo simulations for all values of NJ . This validates the correctness
of (3). Next note that as the number of jammers increases in the network, the outage probability
of the victim receiver increases due to increased interference from the jammers. However the
jamming impact does not increase significantly as NJ increases beyond 16. This is because as
NJ increases, RJ also increases in order to ensure that NJc = 1. This allows the jammers to
attack a larger region of the BS network. Since RJ increases, the jamming impact at the victim
receiver (which is at the origin) is limited due to path loss. In Fig. 2, see that for a 1% network
loading factor (p = 0.01), the outage probability at an SIR threshold of 0dB is less than 1%
when there are no jammers. However, with only 1 jammer per cell, the outage probability can
be increased close to 80%. It is interesting to see that using only a few number of jammers, the
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victim’s link to the serving BS can be significantly degraded.
Fig. 3 shows the outage probability of the victim receiver as a function of the number of
jammers per cell (or per BS) in the network when NJ is fixed to 4. As NJc increases, the
outage probability of the victim receiver increases as expected. Again if the jammer network
can ensure that there exists at least 1 jammer per cell, then the wireless network performance
can be significantly worsened.
Fig. 4 shows the outage probability as a function of the network load/ activity factor p.
The outage probabilities are seen to increase as the activity factor increases due to increased
interference from the interfering BSs. Notice that the outage probability at loading factors of 1%
and 10% is nearly the same. This indicates that the wireless network performance is limited by
the jammer network. However, when the loading factor increases to 100% i.e., all the BSs are
active, then the interference significantly rises which leads to higher levels of outage probability.
Fig. 5 shows the accuracy of the Gaussian-Hermite quadrature approximation in evaluating
the outage probability given in (3). Specifically, it shows how close (12) is to the true outage
probability when the number of terms used in the approximation is varied. It is seen that for N =
15, the approximation is very close to the true value. Further, it is seen that this approximation
holds true for different values of NJ . This approximation will be used next to analyze the
behavior of the outage probability as a function of the various network parameters.
We now study how the jammer network must adapt according to the various wireless network
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parameters in order to achieve a target outage probability. Specifically, we will study how N∗J
in (9) varies as a function of λT , σχ and p when Po,th = 90% at a SIR threshold of θ = 0dB.
We consider two scenarios: a) when RJ changes based on the network parameters, and b) when
RJ is fixed. For the case when RJ changes based on the network parameters, we take NJc to
be equal to 1. For the cases where RJ is fixed, NJc is dependent on NJ .2
Activity factor (p)
10-1 100
N
J*
101
102
RJ fixed
RJ varies
Fig. 6. [Effect of activity factor p]: Number of jammers N∗J required to cause a 90% probability of outage in the wireless
network, as a function of the activity factor (network load) p. PT /PJ = 0dB.
Fig. 6 shows how the number of jammers must scale depending on the activity factor of the
interfering BSs. When RJ varies with the network parameters as RJ =
√
NJ
NJcpiλT
, it depends on
NJ (which is the optimization variable in (9)) and λT = 2√3·5002 exp
[
2σ2χ
α2
]
. When RJ is fixed, it
is taken to be 10√
λT
and in this case NJc is a function of the optimization variable NJ . In both
these cases it is seen in Fig. 6 that N∗J decreases with increasing values of p. This is because
the interference from the BSs (other than the serving BS) increases as p increases. Hence the
number of jammers necessary to achieve Po,th = 90% decreases. When RJ varies, it is seen that
NJc varies inbetween 0.5 and 0.6 which indicates that only one jammer for every two BSs is
sufficient to attack the wireless network. This value of course changes based on the value of RJ .
Fig. 7 shows how the number of jammers must scale depending on the density of the BSs/APs
in the wireless network. Before we explain the behavior of N∗J with respect to λT , we first discuss
a non-jamming scenario result in [18], [19] which is crucial to understand the behavior of N∗J
in Fig. 7. In a non-jamming scenario, the authors in [18], [19] show that the outage probability
2In a military setting where the jammers would intend to attack any device within a given region, RJ is typically taken to be
fixed and then the jammer network behavior is studied.
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Fig. 7. [Effect of λT ]: Number of jammers N∗J required in
a BPP to cause a 90% probability of outage in the wireless
network, as a function of λT , p = 0.1.
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Fig. 8. [Effect of Shadowing]: Number of jammers N∗J
required in a BPP to cause a 90% probability of outage in
the wireless network, as a function of σχ and p = 0.01.
remains constant irrespective of λT in the interference-limited scenario. This is because the
increase in interference from the BSs (besides the serving BS) is equalized by the increased
signal power received from the serving BS. As λT increases, the distribution of r0 (distance
from the serving BS) is concentrated at smaller values which indicates that the serving BS is
much closer for high values of λT . However, this behavior is not seen in this paper due to the
fact that the path loss model (1 + ri)−α chosen in this paper is different from the path loss
model r−αi in [18], [19]. Due to the path loss model considered in this work, it can be shown
that there is a limit on how much the received signal power from the serving BS can increase
which thereby results in a decreasing coverage/ increasing outage probability as λT increases
(due to a lack of space, the formal analysis showing this behavior is skipped in this paper).
Again, we believe that this is a more realistic situation in the context of wireless networks.
When RJ varies as
√
NJ
NJcpiλT
, its value decreases as λT increases and hence the jammers are
distributed in a smaller disk around the victim receiver. Therefore, in addition to the increased
interference from the BSs (other than the serving BS), the jammer interference also increases.
This compound effect indicates that a smaller number of jammers would now be needed to
achieve Po,th = 90%. However, when RJ is fixed, the behavior with respect to λT is not obvious.
An interesting concave-type behavior is seen as λT increases.
When RJ is fixed at 10√
min(λT )
(here min(λT ) is the smallest value of λT considered in Fig. 7),
the jammers are always taken to be uniformly distributed within the disk b(0, 10√
min(λT )
). As
mentioned above, the interference from the BSs increases as λT increases. However at smaller
values of λT , this interference is not sufficient to achieve the target outage probability Po,th.
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Therefore the number of jammers N∗J must increase in order to achieve Po,th = 90%. This
behavior is only seen until a certain value of λT . Beyond this critical value of λT , the interference
due to the BSs significantly increases at which point the number of jammers needed to achieve
an outage probability of Po,th = 90% decreases.
Fig. 8 shows the behavior of N∗J as a function of the standard deviation of the shadowing.
As σχ increases, both λT and the average jammer power levels received at the victim receiver
increase. Therefore, based on this compound behavior and the results in Fig. 7 (which discuss
the jammer impact as a function of λT ), the behavior of N∗J in Fig. 8 follows.
Effect of Retransmissions: Retransmissions are used in most wireless protocols in order to
improve the probability of successful communication (for delay tolerant applications). However,
it is well known that retransmissions increase the interference in the network especially when
the transmissions are uncoordinated. We next discuss the jamming impact against a wireless
network that uses retransmissions.
Let D represent the retransmission limit i.e., a total of D+1 transmissions are allowed for each
packet before it is dropped. The BSs transmit data packets that are assumed to obey a Poisson
arrival process with exogenous arrival rate µ. Since p indicates the network load/ activity factor
of the BSs, it is easy to see that 1 − p = exp(−µ). We assume that the net arrival process
of the new packets and the retransmitted packets in the steady state is also a Poisson process
with arrival rate µs [32]. Let ps denote the activity factor of the BSs at steady state such that
1− ps = exp(−µs).
It was shown in [32] that µ and µs obey the following steady-state relationship
µs = µ+ µsǫ− µδ, (27)
where, ǫ is the probability that a transmitted packet fails and δ = ǫD+1 is the probability that a
packet is dropped. Notice that ǫ = Po i.e., the outage probability. Therefore using (27), we have
ps = 1− (1− p)
1−PD+1o
1−Po . (28)
Figs. 9, 10 show the jamming impact against the wireless network as a function of the number
of retransmissions. Specifically, the steady state activity factor ps is shown as a function of D
in Fig. 9. Although ps increases due to retransmissions, see that this increase is negligible when
there is no jamming. However, with only 1 jammer per cell, the steady state activity factor is
doubled when compared to the no-jamming scenario. This indicates that the interference among
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Fig. 9. [Effect of Retransmissions]: The steady state activity
factor (ps) as a function of the number of retransmissions
(D). The initial activity factor is taken to be p = 0.01. The
SIR threshold θ = 0dB.
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Fig. 10. [Effect of Retransmissions]: The steady state
packet drop probability (δ) as a function of the number of
retransmissions (D). The initial activity factor is taken to be
p = 0.01. The SIR threshold θ = 0dB.
the BSs increases significantly with only a small number of jammers. The packet dropping
probability δ is shown in Fig. 10 as a function of D. While δ decreases when D increases,
notice that with 4 jammers per cell δ is approximately 50%, which suggests that the data cannot
be reliably transmitted in the presence of jammers. The results in Figs. 9, 10 also indicate that
due to the increased interference from the BSs (as a result of increasing network load), the
number of jammers that would be needed to achieve a required outage probability at the victim
receiver can now be decreased.
B. Error Probability
As is convention in the wireless communication literature, the power levels considered in the
results shown below correspond to transmit SNR (defined as transmit power/noise power at the
victim) and not the received power levels at the victim receiver. Via simulations we observed that
for the parameters chosen, the SINR at the victim receiver is typically in the range [−10, 30]dB.
1) Gaussian-Hermite quadrature approximation to evaluate EΨJ
[
Φjagg(|ω|)
]
: We first discuss
the Gaussian-Hermite quadrature approximation used in Lemma 1. We compare
Eχ
[
1F1
[− 1
α
, ; 1− 1
α
;−fχ]] and 1√
pi
∑N
n=1wn1F1
[− 1
α
, ; 1− 1
α
;−f exp(√2σχxn)
]
as a function
of N when σχ = 6dB. The arguments for the Hypergeometric function are chosen based on
the jammer characteristic function shown in Theorem 2. Fig. 11 shows the accuracy of the
approximation as a function of N . It is seen that N = 10 terms closely matches the true value.
Therefore, in what follows we use N = 10 terms and evaluate the error probability expressions.
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Fig. 12. [Effect of Activity Factor]: Average symbol error
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2) Effect of number of jammers and activity factor: Fig. 12 shows the theoretical and the
simulation results for the error probability of a victim receiver as a function of the activity factor
p when BPSK modulation scheme is used both by the BSs and the jammers. Note that we used
BPSK modulation scheme against BPSK victim signal because [2] indicates that BPSK is the
optimal modulation scheme against a BPSK victim signal. However replicating the theoretical
analysis in [2] to the context of networks is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we present
various simulation results that take into account the various jamming signals that may be used.
It is seen in Fig. 12 that the theoretical ASEP expressions shown in Section IV match perfectly
with the Monte Carlo simulation results for various activity factors p. Also, ASEP increases with
p due to increased interference from the active interfering BSs. The error probability in a non-
jamming scenario is seen to be constant due to the interference-limited scenarios considered in
this paper. Fig. 13 shows the theoretical and the simulation results for the victim receiver’s error
probability as a function of the number of jammers in the network. Notice that the theoretical
and the simulation results match perfectly. Also the behavior of ASEP is as expected– ASEP
increases with NJ due to increased interference from the jammer network. However, as noted
earlier in Fig. 2, the jamming impact is limited due to path loss as NJ increases because RJ also
increases. Fig. 14 shows the jamming impact as a function of the number of jammers per cell.
It is seen that the error probability of the victim receiver increases with NJc . Note that because
we consider interference limited scenarios, the error probability flattens out in all these results.
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Fig. 13. [Effect of Number of Jammers]: Average symbol
error rate as a function of the number of jammers when
the victim receiver uses BPSK modulation and the jammer
network uses BPSK modulation. NJc = 1, p = 0.01. The
solid lines indicate the Monte Carlo simulation results and the
markers indicate the theoretical ASEP evaluated using (25).
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Fig. 14. [Effect of NJc ]: Average symbol error rate when
the victim receiver uses BPSK modulation and the jammer
network uses BPSK modulation as a function of the number
of jammers per cell (BS). The solid lines indicate the Monte
Carlo simulation results and the markers indicate the theoret-
ical ASEP evaluated using (25).
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Fig. 15. [Effect of shadowing]: Average symbol error rate
as a function of shadowing power level when the victim
receiver uses BPSK modulation and the jammer network uses
BPSK modulation. The solid lines indicate the Monte Carlo
simulation results and the markers indicate the theoretical
ASEP evaluated using (25).
Transmit SNR (dB)
100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170
Av
er
ag
e 
sy
m
bo
l e
rro
r r
at
e
10-3
10-2
10-1
100 QPSK Jamming
BPSK Jamming
AWGN Jamming
No Jamming
p=0.01 p=0.1
p=1
Fig. 16. [Effect of the jamming signaling scheme]: Average
symbol error rate as a function of p when the victim receiver
uses BPSK modulation and different jamming signals are used
by the jammer network. NJ = 4, NJc = 1. It is seen that
in all cases, the jamming performance of the three jamming
signals are the same.
3) Effect of shadowing: Fig. 15 shows the theoretical and the simulation results for the BPSK
modulation scheme used by the BSs and the jammers as a function of σχ. First notice that
irrespective of σχ, the theoretical expressions match perfectly with the Monte Carlo simulation
results. Further, notice that as seen in the case of the outage probability, the error probability
increases with σχ due to increase in the jammer interference.
Having established the fact that the theoretical expressions indeed match with the simulation
results, we now focus on comparing the performance of the jammer network under a variety of
scenarios.
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4) Effect of various jamming signals: Fig. 16 shows the jamming behavior of various jamming
signals against BPSK modulated victim signals. As was explained earlier, any constant envelope
modulation schemes such as BPSK and QPSK will cause the same impact on the victim.
Similarly, the AWGN jamming signal will cause the same error rate at the victim as the jammers
are not aware of the fading channel between itself and the victim receiver. Therefore, the random
channel gi between the ith jammer and the victim receiver randomly rotates the BPSK and QPSK
jamming signals which will now appear similar to AWGN signals when they reach the victim
receiver. Hence, under such cases the optimal jamming results discussed in [2] and [3] are not
realized. Extending the optimal jamming signaling strategies obtained in [2] and [3] are beyond
the scope of this paper.
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Fig. 17. [No Fading Scenario]: Average symbol error rate when the victim receiver uses BPSK modulation and different
jamming signals are used by the jammer network, NJ = 4, NJc = 1, p = 0.01. In all cases it is seen that the BPSK jamming
outperforms QPSK and AWGN jamming signaling schemes.
5) No fading channel: Here, we consider the following system model
y =
√
PT (1 + r0)
−αs0 +
∑
i∈Ψ(\0)
√
PT (1 + ri)
−αsi
︸ ︷︷ ︸
iagg(r0)
+
∑
i∈ΨJ
√
PJχJi (1 + di)
−αji︸ ︷︷ ︸
jagg
+n, (29)
i.e., the small scale fading effects are ignored. Such a model is commonly encountered in line-
of-sight-based wireless communication systems. We consider this model to show the best case
performance for the jammer network and to show the potential effects that different jamming
signaling schemes may have on the victim receiver. Also notice that the analysis presented for
both the outage probability and error probability cannot be easily extended to the cases where
the fading channel is not considered.
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Fig. 17 shows the ASEP for the system model in (29) for various values of PJ . First notice that
irrespective of the jamming signaling scheme used, the error probability increases with PJ . Since
fading is not considered in this scenario, notice that the behavior of the various jamming signaling
schemes is different which is in contrast to the behavior seen in Fig. 16. Specifically, notice that
BPSK jamming outperforms both QPSK and AWGN jamming signaling schemes and that QPSK
jamming has a slight advantage over AWGN jamming. BPSK and QPSK jamming outperform
AWGN jamming because they are successful in changing the distance between the constellation
points of the victim receiver more effectively than the AWGN jamming signal (recall that error
probability is typically a function of the minimum distance between the constellation points).
This performance of the BPSK jamming is in agreement with the results obtained in [2] for the
point-to-point link scenario. Such a performance analysis can help the BS network to reinforce
their signaling strategies to avoid any adversarial attacks.
C. Limitations and Future Work
1) As mentioned previously, in interference limited scenarios, the NN approximation (corre-
sponding to the modulation scheme of the victim) gives exact error probability expressions
only for the binary modulation schemes. Under the interference limited scenarios, such as
the ones studied in this work, this approximation does not accurately evaluate the error
probability when higher order modulations are considered.
2) It is necessary to obtain closed form approximations for the BPP interference so as to
employ the EiD technique proposed in [15] in order to derive error probability expres-
sions for higher order modulation schemes as well. While the Gaussian approximation
for interference modeling has widely been used in the literature, in our analysis we
observed that this approximation fails to capture the actual effects of the BPP interference.
Fig. 18 compares the error probability of the victim receiver when the BPP interference
is approximated as Gaussian with mean 0 and variance given by
PJE(χ
J)
∫ RJ
0
(1 + r)−α
2r
R2J
dr =
2PJ exp
[
σ2χ
2
]
R2J(α− 2)(α− 1)
[
1− [1 +RJ ]1−α [1 +RJ [α− 1]]
]
(30)
3) During our study, it was observed that standard computational tools such as Matlab and
Mathematica failed in handling singularities in the evaluation of ASEP shown in (25).
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Despite using the approximations for the hypergeometric functions suggested in [17], we
observed that these tools provided significantly different results especially when handling
higher order modulations such as QPSK and 16-QAM. It is therefore necessary to find
alternative techniques that enable us to analyze higher order modulation schemes as well.
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Fig. 18. The symbol error probability of the victim receiver when the jammer interference is approximated as Gaussian with
variance denoted by (30).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied jamming against wireless networks from a physical layer perspective
by employing tools from stochastic geometry. Specifically, we studied jamming against a network
of BS/AP that are increasingly being modeled according to a PPP. Since the victim locations
are typically not known a priori we modeled the jammer network according to a BPP and
studied the wireless network performance using the outage and error probability metrics of a
victim receiver. Several interesting insights about the jammer network behavior were discussed in
terms of these two metrics. We showed that the number of jammers required to attain a specific
outage probability increases (decreases) with victim signal power (jammer power and network
loading). Specifically, it was seen that with only 1 jammer per BS/AP, the outage probability of
the wireless network can be increased from 1% (in the non-jamming case) to 80% and when
retransmissions are used, the effective network activity factor (interference among the BSs) can
be doubled. It was observed that the behavior with respect to the BS density is not obvious.
Specifically, we showed that the required number of jammers increases with the density of the
BS nodes λT only until a certain point beyond which it decreases. Furthermore, we also analyzed
the error probability of the victim receiver, both from a simulation and a theoretical perspective
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and showed that the exact error probability expressions can be evaluated in the case of binary
modulations. We showed that some recent results related to modulation-based jamming in a
point-to-point link setting cannot be directly extended to the case of jamming against wireless
networks.
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APPENDIX A - PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The outage probability expression of the victim receiver under attack by the BPP distributed
jammer network is given by
Po(SIR < θ) = 1− P
[
PT |h0|2(1 + r0)−α∑
i∈Ψ\0 aiPT |hi|2(1 + ri)−α +
∑
i∈ΨJ PJχ
J
i |gi|2(1 + di)−α
> θ
]
= 1− P
[
|h0|2 > θ
∑
i∈Ψ\0 ai|hi|2(1 + ri)−α
(1 + r0)−α
+ θ
∑
i∈ΨJ PJχ
J
i |gi|2(1 + di)−α
PT (1 + r0)−α
]
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(i)
= 1− E
[
exp
[
−
[
θ
∑
i∈Ψ\0 ai|hi|2(1 + ri)−α
(1 + r0)−α
+ θ
∑
i∈ΨJ PJχ
J
i |gi|2(1 + di)−α
PT (1 + r0)−α
]]]
(ii)
= 1−
∫ ∞
r0=0
E
[
exp
[
−
[
θ
∑
i∈Ψ\0 ai|hi|2(1 + ri)−α
(1 + r0)−α
]]]
×
E
[
exp
[
−
[
θ
∑
i∈ΨJ PJχ
J
i |gi|2(1 + di)−α
PT (1 + r0)−α
]]]
2πλTr0 exp(−λTπr20)dr0
(iii)
= 1−
∫ ∞
r0=0
exp
[
−2πpλT
∫ ∞
r=r0
[
1− 1
1 + θ(1 + r0)α(1 + r)−α
]
rdr
]
×


2
R2J
∫ RJ
r=0
∫ ∞
χ=0
1
1 + θ(1+r0)
αPJχ
PT
(1 + r)−α
r exp
[
−
[
log(χ)√
2σχ
]2]
χ
√
2σχ
dχdr


NJ
×
2πλT r0 exp(−λTπr20)dr0 (31)
where (i) follows from the fact that |h0|2 is an exponential random variable with mean 1, (ii)
follows from the fact that the pdf of r0 is 2πλT r0 exp(−λTπr20), and (iii) follows by using the
probability generating functional for the PPP [19], the moment generating function for the BPP
[11], the fact that E(ai) = p, |hi|2, |gi|2 are independent unit mean exponential random variables,
and χJi are independent log-normal random variables with mean 0 and variance σχ.
APPENDIX B - PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The jammer’s characteristic function is evaluated as
EΨJ
[
Φjagg(|ω|)
]
= EΨj
[
NJ∏
i=1
Ezˆ
[
cos
[
|ω|
√
PJ(1 + di)
−α
2 zˆ
]]]
(i)
=
[
EΨjEzˆ
[
cos(|ω|
√
PJ(1 + di)
−α
2 zˆ)
]]NJ (ii)
=
[
Ezˆ
[∫ RJ
0
cos(|ω|
√
PJ(1 + r)
−α
2 zˆ)
2r
R2J
dr
]]NJ
=
[
Ezˆ
[∫ |ω|√PJ
|ω|√PJ (1+RJ )−
α
2
cos(tzˆ)
4
R2Jtα
[ |ω|√PJ
t
] 2
α
[[ |ω|√PJ
t
] 2
α
− 1
]
dt
]]NJ
, (32)
where (i) and (ii) follow because the jammers and their locations are independent and identically
distributed. We now state two results that are used in simplifying the above expression.
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The first result is [26, Eq. 3.771.4]∫ u
0
[1− cos(tz)] t−(1+2/c)dt = cu
−2/c
2
[
−1 + 1F2
[
−1
c
,
[
1
2
, 1− 1
c
]
,−u
2z2
4
]]
,R
(
1
c
)
< 1.
(33)
Next, we evaluate Ezˆ(zˆ2q). Recall zˆ = R(z) =
√
χ|gi||ji| cos(∠gi + ∠ji). First notice that
|gi| cos(∠gi + ∠ji) is a Gaussian random variable with mean 0 and variance 12 (because gi is a
complex Gaussian random variable). Then by using (22), we have
Ezˆ(zˆ
2q) =
Γ(q + 1
2
)E(χq)
|MJ |
√
π
∑
ji∈MJ
|ji|2q, (34)
Substituting (33) and (34) in (32), using the series expansion of hypergeometric function in
(6) and noting that (1
2
)q =
Γ(q+ 1
2
)√
Π
and 1F2[a; b, 1; x] = 1F1[a; b; x], we have (20). Note that
by using Lemma 1, the expectation of the Hypergeometric functions with respect to χ can be
approximated by a summation of N terms.
APPENDIX C - PROOF OF COROLLARY 3
Here, we evaluate the characteristic function of the interference from the BSs other than the
serving BS, Φiagg(ω; r0) where iagg(r0) =
∑
i∈Ψ\{0}
√
PTχi(1 + ri)
−α
2 hisi. Since the effects of
shadowing have been considered by transforming the original PPP, we only need to consider
iagg(r0) =
∑
i∈Ψ\{0}
√
PT (1 + ri)
−α
2 hisi to evaluate the BS interference. We have
Φiagg(ω; r0) = EΨ\{0}

exp

jω ∑
i∈Ψ\{0}
√
PT (1 + ri)
−α
2 hisi




= EΨ\{0}

 ∏
i∈Ψ\{0}
exp
[
jω
√
PT (1 + ri)
−α
2 hisi
]
(i)
= exp
[
2πpλT
∫ ∞
r0
[
E
[
exp
[
jω
√
PT (1 + ri)
−α
2 hisi
]]
− 1
]
rdr
]
(ii)
= exp
[
2πpλT
∫ ∞
r0
[
Φz
[
ω
√
PT (1 + ri)
−α
2
]
− 1
]
rdr
]
, (35)
where (i) follows by using the probability generating functional of the PPP [19] and (ii) follows
by defining a new variable z = hisi which is a circularly symmetric random variable. Since the
interfering BSs are active with a probability p, they form a thinned PPP with density pλT [20]
and therefore the effect of p is seen in the characteristic function of iagg(r0). In other words,
we observe a thinning of the interference field [20]. Now notice that the expression inside the
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integral above is similar to what was seen in the derivation of EΦjagg (Φjagg(ω)) in (19). Therefore,
by following similar steps as in the case of jammer interference in (19) and the analysis shown
in the evaluation of (32), the overall BS interference is given by (23).
